Свою преподавательскую деятельность начал в должности исполняющего обязанности ассоциированного профессора в 1988—1990 годах, затем был ассоциированным профессором в 1990—1993 годах, полным профессором в 1993 году в Калифорнийском университете в Беркли. С 1993 года стал профессором на экономическом факультете, а с 2003 года по настоящее время является именным профессором — профессором Вильяма Кенана[англ.]Северо-Западного университета. Параллельно является профессором с 1997 года, был профессором Арона Рубенштейна в 2004—2011 годах, а с 2011 года по настоящее время профессор Грейс и Даниэль Росс в Тель-Авивском университете[1].
1991—1993 — грант от Национального научного фонда за работу «Эволюция оптимизации поведения и отношения к риску»;
1994—1996 — грант от Национального научного фонда за работу «Эндогенные показатели экспериментов; динамика в не-секционированных моделях и конкуренция в моделях стадо/каскада»;
Lexicographic Beliefs and Assumption,. with Amanda Friedenberg and Marciano Siniscalchi Journal of Economic Theory 163 (2016) 955—985.
Optimal Allocation with Costly Veri.cation,. with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Barton Lipman American Economic Review,104 (12) (2014) 3779-3813.
The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early,.with Michele Piccione, American Economic Journals: Microeconomics, 6 (4) (2014) 162—179.
Costly Self Control and Random Self Indulgence,.with Barton Lipman, Econometrica, 80 (3) (2012) 1271—1302.
Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control,.with Asher Wolinsky, Review of Economic Studies, 79 (1) (2012) 196—226.
How (Not) To Do Decision Theory, with Barton Lipman, Annual Review of Economics, 2 (2010) 257—282
Temptation-Driven Preferences, with Barton Lipman and Aldo Rustichini, Review of Economic Studies 76 (3) (2009) 937—971.
Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying,.with Matthew Jackson and Asher Wolinsky, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 4 (2) (2009) 103—128.
Vote Buying: General Elections,.with Matthew Jackson and Asher Wolinsky, Journal of Political Economy 116 (2) (2008) 351—380.
Interimcorrelated rationalizability, with Drew Fudenberg and Stephen Morris, Theoretical Economics 2 (1) (2007) 15-40.
Evolution of Preferences,.with Jeffrey Ely and Okan Yilankaya, Review of Economic Studies 74 (3) (2007) 685—704.
Non-Bayesian Testing of a Stochastic Prediction,. with Yossi Feinberg, Review of Economic Studies 73 (4) (2006) 893—906.
Topologies on types//Theoretical Economics 1 (3) (2006) 275—309.
Reputation with Equal Discounting in Repeated Games with Strictly Conflicting Interests, with Martin Cripps and Wolfgang Pesendorfer// Journal of Economic Theory 121 (2) (2005) 259—272.
Learning to Play Bayesian Games,.with Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine, Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2) (2004) 282—303.
Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions,.with Asher Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior 43 (2) (2003) 175—188.
Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space,.with Barton Lipman and Aldo Rustichini, Econometrica 69 (4) (2001) 891—934.
Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections, with Michele Piccione, the Journal of Political Economy 108 (1), 2000 — pp.34-55.
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibria, with Drew Fudenberg and David Levine, the Journal of Economic Theory 89 (2), 1999 -pp. 165—185;
On the Evolution of Attitudes Towards Risk,.with Suzanne Scotchmer// Journal of Economic Theory 87 (1), 1999 — pp. 125—143.
Recent Developments in Modeling Unforeseen Contingencies,. With Barton Lipman and Aldo Rustichini, European Economic Review 42 (3-5), 1998 — pp.523-542.
On the Relationship between Mutation Rates and Growth Rates in a Changing Environment,.with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Aldo Rustichini, Games and Economic Behavior 5 (4), 1993 — pp.576-603.
Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge, with Adam Brandenburger// Journal of Economic Theory 59 (1), 1993 — pp. 189—198.
On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior, with Suzanne Scotchmer, Journal of Economic Theory 57 (2) (1992) — pp. 392—406.
Correlated Equilibriumwith Generalized Information Structures, with Adam Brandenburger and John Geanakoplos, Games and Economic Behavior 4 (2) (1992) — pp.182-201.
Signaling Future Actions and the Potential for Sacrifice, with Elchanan Ben-Porath// Journal of Economic Theory 57 (1), 1992 — pp.36-51.
Existence and Dynamic Consistency of Nash Equilibrium with Non-Expected Utility Preferences,.with Zvi Safra and Uzi Segal, Journal of Economic Theory 55 (2) (1991) 229.246.
Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty, with Lawrence Blume and Adam Brandenburger, Econometrica 59 (1), 1991 -pp. 61-80.
Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements, with Lawrence Blume and Adam Brandenburger// Econometrica 59 (1), 1991 — pp. 81-98.
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty, with Drew Fudenberg// Journal of Economic Theory 52 (2) (1990) — pp. 243—267.
One-Sided Patience with One-Sided Communication Does Not Justify Stackelberg Equilibrium, with Joseph Farrell// Journal of Games and Economic Behavior 2 (4), 1990 — pp. 299—303.
Simultaneous Offers and the Inefficiency of Bargaining: A Two Period Example//Journal of Economic Theory 50 (2), 1990 — pp.300-308.
Collusion Through Insurance: Sharing the Cost of Oil Spill Cleanups, with Suzanne Scotchmer, American Economic Review 80 (1) (1990) — pp.249-252.
An Overview of Lexicographic Choice Under Uncertainty, with Lawrence Blume and Adam Brandenburger, Annals of Operations Research 19 (1989) — pp.231-246.
Asset Demands without the Independence Axiom//Econometrica 57 (1), 1989 — pp.163-169
Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria,. with Adam Brandenburger, Econometrica 55 (6) (1987) 1391—1402.
Common Knowledge with Probability 1,with Adam Brandenburger// Journal of Mathematical Economics 16 (3), 1987 -pp. 237—245.
An Axiomatic Characterization of Preferences under Uncertainty: Weakening the Independence Axiom//Journal of Economic Theory, 40 (2),1986 — pp.304-318.